THE

# POLITICAL TESTAMENT

OF

# MAXIMIL. ROBERTSPIERRE;

WITH AN

## ACCOUNT

OF THE

## SECRET NEGOCIATIONS,

CARRIED ON UNDER HIS DIRECTION,

WITH SEVERAL OF THE

## PRINCIPAL STATES OF EUROPE, &c.

WRITTEN AND SIGNED BY HIS OWN HAND.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

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# ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following publication, if it be the genuine production of the man whoſe name it bears, muſt be allowed by all to be highly curious and intereſting; but the queſtion will naturally be aſked at the outſet, what are the proofs of its authenticity? The publiſhers therefore will candidly ſubmit the evidence to the judgment of the reader. They are perſuaded that it muſt appear ſuch as to have made it their duty to preſent the work to the world.

This paper, with very many others ſufficient to form ſeveral volumes, came from Mr. Vadier, who was the colleague of Robertſpierre in the committee of general ſafety, and who conſequently, if he could

even be ſuppoſed to have forged theſe papers, would be an authority little inferior to Robertſpierre himſelf for the facts contained in them. At the time of Robertſpierre's fall Vadier took part againſt him. The cauſe of quarrel between them was, that the former had treated with ridicule a report in which the latter had denounced a conſpiracy, ſaid to be carried on by a pretended propheteſs, calling herſelf mademoiſelle Theos. Vadier, in the attack which he made on his former friend, attributed the ridicule thrown upon him, to his having brought forward a letter ſent from this fanatic, or ſome of her diſciples, to Robertſpierre, which, in the date and general tenor of the contents, ſeems to correſpond very nearly with a letter mentioned in this Political Teſtament, as having been received from ſome one in the name of the Pope. During the ſhort ſtruggle that enſued between the convention and the partizans of Robertſpierre, Vadier made himſelf maſter of the private papers of the accuſed. Soon after he was himſelf

himſelf obliged to fly, and carried the papers with him into Switzerland.

By a near relation of Mr. Vadier they were communicated to Mr. le Gout, a native of that country, and what on the continent is called a man of letters. He had been private ſecretary to the unfortunate Clermont de Tonerre, in the time of the firſt national aſſembly of France, had frequent opportunities of ſeeing the hand-writing of Robert-ſpierre, and was perfectly acquainted with it. He was allowed, for a trifling conſideration, to tranſcribe what was ſhewn him; and has poſitively ſworn to the hand-writing of the originals, which he tranſcribed.

Mr. le Gout brought his copies to England with an intention of publiſhing them. He talked to ſome bookſellers on the ſubject; but was by them adviſed to go to Hamburgh, as a cheaper and more convenient place of publication. This opinion he followed; but,

during his ſhort ſtay here, gave the free uſe of his manuſcripts to a friend, and by that friend the Political Teſtament was ſelected and tranſlated.

When it was reſolved to print it, the propriety of prefixing the moſt ſolemn authentication, which could be procured from Mr. le Gout, was ſuggeſted. Application was accordingly made to him at Nienhus, in the neighbourhood of Hamburgh, where he now reſides; and that produced the affidavit, a tranſlation of which will be found at the end of this advertiſement, and the original of which, under the ſeal of the burgomaſter, is in the hands of the publiſhers.

Such is the account which has been conſtantly given by the tranſlator, a perſon of undoubted honour. It remains to touch ſhortly on the internal evidence.

The

The character of the writer is of a forced and unnatural kind, in that falſe taſte of theatrical grandeur, which has diſtinguiſhed all the eminent actors in the French revolution. It holds up to our view a man of extravagant ambition, of conſummate vanity. But theſe features ſo notoriouſly marked Robertſpierre that the mereſt bungler could not have uſurped his name without aſſuming theſe qualities. The work is that of a common-place ſtateſman, tinctured deeply with the popular politics of the country; of the ſchool of Favier, whoſe ſecret report on the relations of France to all the ſeveral ſtates of Europe was found in the cabinet of Louis the XVIth, and formed the political creed of all the republican factions of France. The leading articles of faith are a great dread of the houſe of Auſtria, and abhorrence of the treaty between France and that power in 1756, a fixed hatred of the Engliſh name, a ſtrong jealouſy of Ruſſia, and a vehement deſire of returning to an alliance with Pruſſia, as well

as of regaining an aſcendency, by means of Poland, in the affairs of the north. A diſlike of America was peculiar to Robertſpierre.

No reader who has the leaſt knowledge of the human heart will be ſurprized to find the author declaring diſguſt and contempt "for his unworthy countrymen." But we have direct proof that ſuch were the actual feelings of Robertſpierre. Mr. Garat, who deſcribes him as a man of atrabilious temperament, and full of ſuſpicions*, has preſerved a long converſation which he had with him on the ſtate of the country, not long after the aſſaſſination of Louis the XVIth. The reſult of the whole on the part of Robertſpierre, was an expreſſion which ſtruck the other with the moſt ſerious alarm, "I AM QUITE WEARY (ſaid he) OF THE REVOLUTION; I AM SICK." It is to his indulgence of his firſt atrabilious impreſſions againſt all around him, and not to any ſyſtem of tyranny, that Garat

* Memoires ſur la Revolution, p. 57.

aſcribes

aſcribes all his cruelties; and his new baſtilles, ſcaffolds, and permanent guillotines are here juſtified on a plea of neceſſity ariſing out of the worſt opinion of the French character.

But the tenderneſs which is ſhewn for the memory of the deceaſed king, may, at firſt ſight, be more ſtartling. It is from his death only that the writer of the Political Teſtament dates his own immediate aim at the throne, which Louis "knew not how to occupy—how to defend." Yet in perfect conſonancy with this are ſome facts related by Madame Roland *. We find from her that it was not only when he was in effect king of France, that Robertſpierre thought "a monarchical, not a democratical government, could alone make Frenchmen happy." During the flight of the king in 1791, when all the party with which he then acted were eagerly looking forward to the opportunity of creating a republic, he aſked them, with a

* Part I. p. 58. Engliſh Tranſlation.

ſarcaſtic

ſarcaſtic ſneer, "*what was a republic?*" When the king was brought back from Varennes, Robertſpierre alone, of all his party, rejoiced in the event; and the cauſe of his final breach with Briſſot was the declaration of war againſt Auſtria, which Briſſot avowed himſelf to have effected, and the object of which he boaſted to have been the abolition of royalty *.

* J. P. Briſſot, député à la convention nationale, à tous les républicains de France, ſur la ſocieté des jacobins, page 8.

The whole paſſage is remarkable; and it is added here as the pamphlet of Briſſot, from which it is taken, has never been tranſlated into Engliſh, nor this paſſage quoted by our political writers.

"It was the abolition of royalty that I had in view in cauſing war to be declared. Wiſe men underſtood me on the 30th of December 1791, when, in anſwer to Robertſpierre, who talked of nothing but treaſon to be feared, I told him I had but one fear, it was that we ſhould have no treaſon. We have occaſion for treaſons; our ſalvation lies in them; for there ſtill exiſts ſtrong doſes of poiſon in the boſom of France, and there muſt be ſtrong exploſions to expel it. Great treaſons are fatal only to traitors; they are uſeful to the people; they make that diſappear which oppoſes the grandeur of the French nation—royalty."

The

The date at the end of this paper, and the alluſion in the beginning to Cecilia Regnaut, fix the time of its ſuppoſed compoſition. But it is ſingular that in his ſpeech on that pretended danger to his life, Robertſpierre expreſsly told the convention his determination of leaving behind him a Political Teſtament, the outline of which, as he there very ſhortly intimates it, does not agree with the remainder of that ſpeech, but does agree ſufficiently well with the contents of this publication. Conſidering himſelf as likely to fall by ſome of thoſe vile people, who, he ſays, conſpire againſt his country and mankind, "at leaſt (adds he) I will leave a Teſtament, "the reading of which ſhall make tyrants "and their accomplices tremble. *I may* "PERHAPS *diſcover formidable ſecrets which* "*a ſort of puſillanimous prudence had deter-* "*mined me to conceal.* I will tell on what "ſtill depends the ſalvation of my country, "and the triumph of liberty *." It much

* Moniteur, 29th May 1794.

ſtrengthens

ſtrengthens the force of this confirmation, that neither the tranſlator, nor Mr. le Gout, ſeemed to be aware of its exiſtence.

The narrative of the ſecret negociations is in itſelf apparently not improbable. Two circumſtances which cannot at preſent be revealed, give much appearance of truth to ſome part of that narrative reſpecting two northern powers. The reader, however, muſt receive the whole with caution. Robertſpierre for his own purpoſes might miſrepreſent the conduct of the oppoſite parties in theſe tranſactions; and his own agents and emiſſaries might deceive him, eſpecially in their charges of money for ſecret ſervices. An apprehenſion of this kind is hinted in the Political Teſtament itſelf.

Every thing is now fairly placed before the reader. The publiſhers have only in addition to requeſt indulgence to any unidiomatic phraſe, or other error, which may have eſcaped

eſcaped their attention; the tranſlator, though born in the Britiſh dominions, having paſſed his time almoſt wholly in France, and not having been in this kingdom during the printing of the tranſlation. The name of the author has been ſpelt variouſly at different periods of the Revolution; but that mode of ſpelling has been preſerved which was found in the manuſcript copy of the tranſlation, and in the affidavit of Mr. le Gout.

*Tranſlation*

*Tranſlation of the Affidavit of Mr. le Gout relative to the Authenticity of the following Work.*

" Louis Le Gout, Swiſs citizen, aged thirty-five years, dwelling at preſent in this city, preſented himſelf this day before me, and declared on oath that he purchaſed, from a relation of Mr. Vadier, formerly a member of the national convention in France, and at preſent reſiding in Switzerland, the poſthumous works of Maximilian Robertſpierre; that he has copied them from the original written by ſaid Robertſpierre's own hand; that he permitted, in the month of Auguſt laſt, a friend in England to tranſlate into Engliſh one part, called by the Author *His Political Teſtament, with the Secret Negociations under his Direction*; and that this Political Teſtament, &c. *ſigned by Maximilian Robertſpierre*, commences with the following words, *Thoſe who firſt diſturb a ſtate always labour, without ſuſpecting it, for others, not for themſelves*, &c. &c. &c.

" Sworn before me, at the town-hall of Nienhus, the ſeventh of November, in the year of grace 1795,

" T. U. MEYER, Burgomaſter."

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THE

THE

# POLITICAL TESTAMENT

OF

# M. ROBERTSPIERRE.

THOSE who firſt diſturb a ſtate always labour, without ſuſpecting it, for others, not for themſelves. This truth has been experienced by Necker, Orleans, La Fayette, Briſſott, Petion, Roland, and many others. I have long been perſuaded of it; and therefore, during the firſt years of the revolution, I always took care to keep at a diſtance; yet at the ſame time to be known as an incorruptible patriot, whom the amateurs of liberty might one day chuſe as their ſaviour. That time arrived ſooner than I expected, but not ſooner than I deſired; and he who in 1789 was a poor attorney of Arras, is, in 1794, the arbitor of the world, with millions of wealth

at his diſpoſal, and millions of men whoſe exiſtence depends on his good pleaſure. But diſguſted with power to which no dignity was affixed, I have retired voluntarily from the miſcreants of the committee of public ſafety, who, though my ſlaviſh inſtruments, have dared to oppoſe my will, which for theſe twelve months has been the only law in France. But they ſhall pay dearly for their oppoſition ſhould any of my vaſt ſchemes miſcarry; becauſe the hatred of Frenchmen for me I ſhall bequeath to them: and they ſhall pay dearly for it if I ſucceed, becauſe the ſucceſs will be the fruit of my own labour; and I ſhall hope, therefore, alone to enjoy its rewards.

The variable character, or rather the no character of my unworthy countrymen, makes me, however, fear the event of a criſis which cannot be far off; a criſis which will either make me the Auguſtus of France, or ſend me to the ſcaffold: my great, my wonderful efforts, crowned with victory, have already proved to my cotemporaries, what, in the latter caſe, this my political teſtament will prove to poſterity—that I am not unworthy of being the dictator of France and the terror of Europe.

I may

I may be, perhaps, accuſed in hiſtory of having ſpilt too much blood; nay, hiſtorians may claſs me among tyrants: but have they not already done the ſame honour to the meek Louis the XVIth, who would ſtill have reigned if he had known how to puniſh; and of whoſe weakneſs nothing is a ſtronger proof, than that two intriguing women, Mes Dames, Necker and Roland, by the revolutions of the 14th of July 1789, and of the 10th of Auguſt 1792, overturned a throne within the ſpace of four years, the foundation of which was upwards of fourteen centuries old.

The profound ſtudy of the hiſtory of my country had furniſhed me with a perfect knowledge of the real character of a Frenchman long before I had any hope of profiting by that knowledge. Fear, continual fear, for their lives, property, and liberty, will make Frenchmen do wonders: but without ſcaffolds or baſtilles France indiviſable, France victorious, never can or will long exiſt. Henry the IVth was beloved, and died by aſſaſſination. Louis the XIIIth was feared, and after a glorious reign died in his bed. As long as Louis the XIVth was feared, that

is to ſay, as long as Louvois tyrannized over France, his glory was ſo great as to make all Europe jealous; yet it was known in the remoteſt parts of Aſia, that as ſoon as age and the death of Louvois had leſſened the fears of his ſubjects for his deſpotiſm, his arms were no longer victorious; and, had it not been for the intrigues of ſome women at the court of St. James's, he would have ſtood a good chance of dying dethroned in the Tower of London, if he had not been murdered by Frenchmen.

The regent and Louis the XVth were neither loved or feared; but their miniſters were feared: and it was their dungeons being crowded with victims that prevented their maſters dying by the ſwords of their ſubjects ſooner than by their own debaucheries. No king of France was more loved and leſs feared than Louis the XVIth; and no king of France, before him, aſcended the ſcaffold.

From the death of Louis the XVIth I aimed at the throne he knew not how to occupy—how to defend. I had been unworthy of reigning with ſucceſs, if I had not followed ſteps oppoſite to thoſe of my predeceſſor. After the deſtruction of the faction

of

of the political hypocrite Briſſot, I had yet to fear being devoured by the tygers Danton and Marat. By undermining the popularity of the former with the jacobins, I was able to ſend him to the ſame ſcaffold to which he aſſiſted me in ſending Briſſot and Louis the XVIth: and Charlotte Cordee delivered me from Marat by a death too honourable for ſuch an ignorant fanatic.

I began my reign by making the guillotine and the committee of public ſafety permanent; I next found out ſuch men, and of ſuch parts, as a revolutionary government requires. This done, I ſeldom, except upon ſolemn occaſions, condeſcended to ſpeak in the convention; but not a day has, for a long time, paſſed over without my praiſe, either directly or indirectly, being pronounced there by my temporary aſſociates in government; all jealous one of another, and ſtriving who ſhall flatter me moſt.

I now poſſeſs the ſovereign power, but not the name. A word from me creates a general, or ſends him to the ſcaffold: an order from me conquers a province—ruins it—plunders it; and the armies which perform theſe mighty deeds are by my enemies called

the ſoldiers of Robertſpierre—of Robertſpierre who has ſent ſo many of their relations and friends to the guillotine. The ſoldiers know this, and trembling and deteſting me, they enlarge my career of glory, and of proſperity; ſuch is the power of terror and fear over Frenchmen. They are ſenſible, that if they refuſe to fight, to die for me as ſoldiers, I ſhall ſend them as traitors, or conſpirators, to follow their connections to the ſcaffold.

*Te Deum* was publicly ſung for my eſcape from an imaginary woman aſſaſſin: but I dare not flatter my pride while the buſts of Marat occupy the places of Chriſt and of kings, in the churches and public ſquares all over France.

With the deſtiny of France—of Europe in my hands; flattered, reſpected, or dreaded every where, I am not happy, nor can I be happy until a new revolution confirms me *all in one*. The power is already wholly mine, but I am ſtill confined to forms; and am often obliged to employ the men I abhor, becauſe, having long been my inſtruments, they have had the audacity to penetrate my ſchemes.

No convention — no committees — or no Robertſpierre muſt ſoon be the order of the day. I have advanced too far to retreat: that is intirely cut off. The throne or the ſcaffold muſt ſoon be my lot. That I merit the former no body can deny, who compares France in July 1793, with France in July 1794, and remembers that the change is my work.

*Aut Cæſar aut nullus*—is my motto. The verſatile Barrere, and the blood-hound Billaud, deputed by the other members of the committee of public ſafety, have offered me a continual preſidency in a ſenate which ſhould conſiſt of the preſent members of that committee: they alſo offered me to overthrow the convention;—to marry me into the Capet family;—to look upon me as their ſovereign, and to act only as my miniſters. But what have theſe abject villains not offered? I, however, know men too well to liſten to their offers, produced only by fear for their own ſafety: as ſoon as that ſhould vaniſh hatred would ſucceed; and they would be the firſt to undermine the throne their trembling hands had erected. No; they ſhall all periſh except Couthon and St. Juſt: the former, rotten by

diſeaſe, cannot live long enough to be dangerous; and as to the latter, I want his abilities, his penetration; and as long as I want him his life ſhall be ſaved. It is to him I owe Pichegreu, a man of the greateſt military talents, of the greateſt activity, of little ambition, and of no party or family to attempt to play the part of a Monk, or a Demourier.

But I have already ſaid both too much and too little of myſelf: too much, if I ſhould become ſovereign of France; too little, if I ſhould not, and that this paper ſhould reach poſterity. I flatter myſelf with the proſpect of the former; my popularity, the commons of Paris, the commander of its guard, and, more than all, the jacobins all over France being at my diſpoſal, aſſure me that I have more to hope than to fear.

To the beſt of my judgment, and according to the ſyſtem I ſhall one day endeavour to eſtabliſh, the political intereſts of France with other powers are as follows:

WITH

## WITH SPAIN

France may ſubſiſt as it is without an alliance with Spain; but Spain cannot long retain its preſent political influence and power in Europe, without renewing its former French connections; as its colonies, the only ſource of its riches, will otherwiſe ſoon change their maſters, and either follow the alluring example of the Engliſh Americans and aſſume independance, or, what is more profitable, become the eaſy prey of the rapacious Engliſh government. The latter, I ſay, is more probable, becauſe ſhould the Engliſh by any future treaty of commerce gain greater privileges, or freer acceſs than they at preſent enjoy to the Spaniſh colonies, their ſhips of war would ſoon ſubdue places which their merchant-ſhips only were permitted to viſit as traders: and however inferior the abilities of Vergennes, as a miniſter, were, he was right in ſaying, that the Engliſh would always look upon Spaniſh America as a proper repriſal for their own loſt colonies on that continent; and that their endeavours would, for a long time, be employed to find a favourable opportunity of

ſeizing

ſeizing or conqeuring them as ſuch. And where is the power of Europe, except France, which can prevent England doing this, ſooner or later? The American ſtates may be jealous of ſuch an attempt, and threaten a rupture with England; but England knows too well the preſent weakneſs of theſe ſtates to take any notice of threats, which cannot for half a century to come, be carried into execution without endangering the very exiſtance of the American empire; the government and credit of which are not yet ſo far eſtabliſhed, but that an unſucceſsful war with England might cauſe a new revolution, and the American citizens again become Engliſh ſubjects, particularly as England has ſtill a powerful party in theſe ſtates.

In the quarrel about the Engliſh ſettlement at Nootka, there is no doubt but England would have profited of that opportunity for making this Spaniſh conqueſt, had not the French government ſhowed its determination to adhere ſtrictly to its treaty with Spain: and however Spain has ſince imprudently connected itſelf with the grand league againſt France, its cabinet has, on different occaſions (as ſhall be mentioned hereafter) ſhowed that

it does not approve of the family quarrel of its king, who, for avenging the blood of one of his relations, totally neglects the real intereſt not only of himſelf but of millions of his ſubjects; becauſe in leſs than four campaigns the Spaniſh dominions in Europe (if they were worth it) would be conquered by France, with leſs trouble, perhaps, than England could conquer the Spaniſh colonies, as may be proved by what the French and Spaniſh troops have done during this campaign.

The Engliſh armament in 1790 was only an experiment to prove, whether the revolution had not cooled the connection between France and Spain, as being a family connection, the head of which no longer poſſeſſed the love of Frenchmen, his ſubjects; or could, without the approbation of the national aſſembly, fulfil former engagements. But if Frenchmen hated the Bourbons, they loved their country; and knew its honour and its intereſt required them to ſave Spain, and make the family treaty a national one between Frenchmen and Spaniards. As ſoon as the naval armament of Breſt was in a ſtate of forwardneſs, the cabinet of St. James's lowered its threats, and gladly agreeing to

pacific

pacific arrangements put a ſtop to its warlike preparations. But theſe arrangements are ſuch as may at any time afford a pretence for the Engliſh cabinet to carry its former threats into execution: the ignorance of the Spaniſh miniſtry at that time, and the ſubtilty of the Engliſh, having placed it in the power of the latter to do ſo even with the approbation of their parliament: and as to the people of England, ſince Anſon's ſucceſsful cruiſe againſt the Spaniards, and his bringing home ſo much riches, nothing can pleaſe them more than a Spaniſh war; or, to ſpeak more truly, than the proſpect of getting the Spaniſh dollars. A war, therefore, with Spain, would be carried on by them with more vigour and activity, than with any other nation upon earth. Hope of gain would ſoon man the numerous ſhips of Great Britain, while fear of the Engliſh would cauſe even the few Spaniſh ſailors to deſert. But ſuppoſing that the jealouſy of other countries ſhould oblige England to treat inſtead of fighting, would not England ſtill have it in its power to preſcribe ſuch articles of peace as would place Spain equally under its deſpotic power, as Portugal has been for eighty years paſt, and

as it will for ever be, ſhould that nation not take advantage of the preſent ſituation of Europe, to throw off the Engliſh yoke. But were Spain ſoon to renew its former connections with France, the dread of a French war would prevent any attempt at a Spaniſh one, however deſirable to the Engliſh. Such a renewal muſt, however, take place very ſpeedily to be of effect. The Engliſh and all Europe have witneſſed the little dependence there is to be placed in Spaniſh ſoldiers: and the exhauſted ſtate of the finances of Spain, the ruinous condition of its navy, and the deſtruction of part of the navy of France, will otherwiſe make England, with its great reſources, too powerful even for both France and Spain together, unleſs Spain ſhould conſent to have, at leaſt, half the garriſons of its principal places in America compoſed of French ſoldiers.

An alliance with France will not only preſerve Spain in its preſent ſituation, but may greatly augment its political influence, particularly in Italy, where, from having a great deal it now has none; becauſe, if the ſucceſſes of the French arms ſhould continue, as it is

pro-

probable they may, France will have it in her power to chuſe her own mediators for peace, and to inſiſt on terms which ſhall eſtabliſh her influence, and that of her allies, for times to come. Such are the numerous advantages which Spain would derive from an alliance with France.

The manufacturies of France are almoſt ruined by the revolution; it is not therefore the forming an advantageous trade with Spain which makes me wiſh for a Spaniſh alliance; no, I have no other intereſt in view than that of preventing the already too powerful and too wealthy Engliſh from becoming ſtill richer and more powerful, by the conqueſt of Spaniſh America, which France by all means muſt prevent; and which it may and ſhall prevent, if Spain will but open its eyes in time, and be ſenſible that, whether ſo many Frenchmen or ſo many Spaniards are deſtroyed, England will equally rejoice, as ſhe will have ſo many the fewer enemies to combat at ſome time or other.

*Secret negociations under my direction.*

I have ſaid above, that Spain does not approve the family quarrel of its king; and that I have good reaſon for ſaying ſo, will appear from what follows.

That the well-known favourite the duke d'A—— governs the queen of Spain, and that the queen governs the king is generally underſtood; but that the chevalier S—— governs the duke d'A——, and that his miſtreſs, ſignora P——, governs the chevelier, though ſome cabinets of Europe may know, the people at large are ignorant, as they generally have been, of thoſe trivial incidents, by which moſt of the great events both in former and preſent times have been produced.

Bourgoing, the French miniſter at Madrid, was ordered to be arreſted, and war with France was determined upon, as ſoon as the fate of Louis the XVIth was known. Bourgoing found means to conceal himſelf; but young du F——, a phyſician, and one of Bourgoing's ſecretaries, was arreſted. This du F—— is a handſome inſinuating man, and had long ſhared the favours of ſignora P——

with

with the chevelier S——, who payed her too liberally to expect to keep her to himſelf. Du F—— did not remain long in confinement: ſignora P—— had the addreſs to perſuade the chevalier S——, that her favourite maid was in love with him; and as he was not anſwerable for the actions of Bourgoing, the miniſter, he was ſoon ſet at liberty, on giving his word of honour not to quit Madrid without leave. When Toulon was delivered up to the Engliſh, fortunately they had not troops enough to take poſſeſſion of the place and all its forts: they were therefore obliged to aſk aſſiſtance from their new allies, the Spaniards. Engliſh pride would not, however, ſtoop to Spaniſh command, though the troops of Spain at Toulon were more numerous, and her officers ſuperior both in rank and abilities to thoſe of England; and this diſdain of foreign authority was increaſed when a few weeks after troops from Naples and Piedmont landed to be at the ſole diſpoſal of the Engliſh commanders. Spaniſh haughtineſs is as great as Engliſh pride, conſequently mutual jealouſy and diſagreement took place between the officers and troops of the two nations.

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The French government muſt have been ſtupid indeed not to take advantage of theſe differences; but the difficulty lay in finding means of ſending inſtructions to du F——, as all the French had been either impriſoned or baniſhed from Spain: happily the connection of one of our agents at Genoa, with a German merchant eſtabliſhed at Cadiz, opened a channel for conveying inſtructions, and, what was ſtill more uſeful, money. By following the former du F—— was able to employ the latter to effect; and it muſt be confeſt, that lucky circumſtances much aſſiſted our negociation. The court of Spain wiſhed to have the French navy ſent into Spaniſh harbours, there to be ſecured for the ſon of Louis the XVIth; but the Britiſh miniſter inſiſted on its either remaining intirely at Toulon, or the greater part to be ſent to Gibraltar and England, as the beſt means of ſecuring it for young Capet, and enſuring to England an indemnification for the vaſt expence ſhe had been put to by the poſſeſſion of Toulon. During theſe negociations between the courts of Madrid and St. James's, news arrived that the Engliſh had got poſſeſſion, by treachery, of ſome places in St. Domingo: du F——

took an opportunity of pointing out, in the ſtrongeſt manner, to Signora P——, that by lending its aſſiſtance every where to make England more powerful, Spain might weaken France, but it would be only to ruin itſelf in the end; as the local ſituation of France, and the ſpirit of its inhabitants were ſuch, that though it might be rendered unable to prevent the ruin of its natural ally by England, England could never conquer France, or, at leaſt, not keep its conqueſt without the aſſiſtance of all Europe. That, as to Spain, ſhould England once poſſeſs its colonies, which it eaſily might if France ſhould be too much weakened to give the aſſiſtance neceſſary for their defence, it would be either conquered or fall into nullity. That as to the Spaniſh part of St. Domingo, it was known by long experience, both in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, that where ever the Engliſh once get footing they no longer ſuffer any participation, and it might therefore be already looked upon as a conqueſt to England. Arguments of weight, and eſpecially of golden weight, ſeldom fail of having ſome effect: orders were ſent to the Spaniſh commander at St. Domingo not to co-operate with the Engliſh,

Engliſh, as he had been directed to do ſome time before, but to conquer what he could for his maſter; and the Spaniſh admirals and generals in the Mediterranean had inſtructions ſent them rather to watch than to act with the Engliſh.

No farther connection could poſſibly be formed with the Spaniards until General O'Hara was made priſoner by us. Then, however, by means of a female ſpy, the Spaniſh officers at Toulon, ſtill more diſguſted by the attempts of the Engliſh to humiliate them, gave the French commiſſaries to underſtand, that a negociation might be opened between them as ſoon as a meſſenger, which they had diſpatched to Madrid, ſhould return. At this time the ſituation of the republican army was dreadful; it was deſtitute of every thing neceſſary to carry on a ſiege; and the want of wholeſome nutriment ſent the ſoldiers by hundreds in a day to the hoſpital and the grave. But this was not all; a general inſurrection was every hour expected to burſt out in the department round Toulon, where the people had been worked upon by Engliſh emiſſaries, and it was therefore once determined to withdraw the army from before the

town, and retreat to the other ſide of the Durance, when, fortunately, the Spaniſh courier arrived, and every thing was ſettled between my brother, on our part, and major S—— on the other, with reſpect to Toulon. This ſort of a treaty was not ſigned; and yet I believe few ſigned treaties were ever better obſerved, or, at leaſt, had more endeavours uſed to make them obſerved by both parties.

The Spaniards, in conſequence of this agreement, being attacked at an appointed time, fled on all ſides, and left the Engliſh every where to bite the duſt, and particularly at a ſtrong hold, called by them Fort Mulgrave, where not one Engliſhman eſcaped; for after the retreat of the Spaniards they were ſurrounded on all ſides, and had no quarter given. The ſhips which the Spaniards were to burn they did not ſet fire to; but evacuating, and, in the general confuſion, ordering the Neapolitan and other troops to evacuate thoſe forts which commanded part of the inner harbour, they put it in the power of our troops, not only to have prevented the Engliſh from burning the French ſhips, but alſo to have deſtroyed ſome of the Engliſh ſhips which were within reach of the forts; but

but the ignorance of our officers, and the confuſion which, amidſt the darkneſs of the night, prevailed among our ſoldiers, permitted the Engliſh to ſave their own ſhips and to burn ſome of ours. The Britiſh ſhips had, however, more than one eſcape at this period; conformably to the agreement, the Spaniards were to attempt the deſtruction of ſome of them, by cutting the cables and blowing up, in the harbour, ſome old French men of war laden with gunpowder. This indeed they did, but too late to cauſe any damage to the Engliſh; and it is in this inſtance alone that we have any reaſon to complain of the Spaniards; for with reſpect to the magazines and other places which they were to have fired, though they did put fire to them, to prevent their being ſuſpected by the Engliſh, yet it was in ſuch a manner as to be very ſoon extinguiſhed.

If the Spaniards kept the agreement on the one ſide, the French government did the ſame on the other. Port Vendres and two forts were, after a ſham fight, delivered up to the Spaniards, who had the ſatisfaction of being thought victorious over the French at a time when the French were victorious over all

other nations at war with them, from the borders of the Rhine to the Mediterranean ſea.

After theſe tranſactions with the Spaniſh government we had reaſon to believe that peace and an alliance between us, was not far off; but Auſtrian intrigues and Engliſh gold deſtroyed this opportunity for Spain to finiſh a war, in which ſhe had nothing to gain and much to loſe. Du F—— was ſuddenly arreſted and ſent to ſome fort in the ſouth of Spain, and ſignora P—— eſcaped with turning off the poor maid, by whom chevalier S—— ſuſpected du F—— had got acceſs to his miſtreſs. But though du F—— is arreſted, the jealouſy and hatred he has kindled, perhaps againſt their will, between the Spaniards and Engliſh is ſo ſtrong, that I doubt whether the former will ever more act cordially with the latter either by ſea or land; or the latter have ſufficient confidence in the former to co-operate with them. In the manner, however, in which our troops have opened the campaign in Spain, I hope that government will ſoon be obliged to ſue for a peace, which they might once have commanded.

SARDINIA.

## SARDINIA.

THE poſſeſſion of Savoy, and the country of Nice, and the troubles in the iſland of Sardinia, muſt prove to the old king of that country that his own and his kingdom's exiſtence depends upon the good pleaſure of the French government; and that if the intereſt of France required the total annihilation of both, neither Engliſh ſubſidies nor Auſtrian mercenaries could ſave them. Blinded, however, by his impolitic attachment to the Capet family, and ſeduced by intriguing emigrants in Engliſh pay, no potentate in Europe has ſhewn himſelf more diſpoſed than the king of Sardinia to effect a counter-revolution, and make our free Frenchmen again ſlaves under the Capets. Fortunately, however, his power is not as great as his will is good; and he has to aſcribe to his own conduct, in proſecuting French patriots and protecting French emigrants, the loſs of Savoy and Nice, the weak and unprotected ſituation of which, when taken poſſeſſion of by the

French troops, ſhews the ignorance or treachery of his counſellors and miniſters, who ſhould have prepared them in a fitter manner for receiving his avowed enemies the French patriots, who, if unſucceſsful every where elſe, had only to enter his territory with arms in their hands to avenge the injuries he might be ſure they would not forget their having received from the father-in-law of the heretofore monſieur and count de Artois.

If, on the return of peace, France ſhould condeſcend to relinquiſh her conqueſts, an alliance with the king of Sardinia might be of ſome uſe to her, becauſe the troops of France muſt paſs through the Sardinian dominions whenever ſhe ſhall be able to make the ſame change in the Auſtrian poſſeſſions in Italy that ſhe is now likely to make in thoſe of Flanders and Brabant. But ſhould France retain Nice, and ſome ſtrong paſſes which ſhe now poſſeſſes in the Alps, and which it is her intereſt to hold, it would, in my opinion, be more to her advantage to let the court of St. James's feed that of Turin with its uſual liberal ſubſidies, than to form an alliance with the king of Sardinia: if the alliance ſhould in future become deſirable, it will be eaſily obtained,

obtained, for to judge from the well-known character of this court it would only be to offer a few thouſand louis d'ors more than the Engliſh, and promiſe it aſſiſtance for conquering, in the territories of Genoa and Lombardy, an equivalent for what it has loſt by the French in Savoy and Piedmont.

As to commercial connections, the produce of this country being nearly the ſame as that of many of the ſouthern departments of France, and the inhabitants extremely poor, it ſtands more in need of France than France does of it; therefore, every thing conſidered, its alliance would be no more neceſſary or advantageous in a commercial than political point of view.

*Secret Negociations, under my Direction, with Sardinia.*

WHEN Lyons was in open rebellion, and Toulon and Marſeilles with all the ſouth of France under the influence of federaliſm, this court thought proper to make propoſals, which the French government liſtened to only to gain time, and prevent the Sardinians endea-

endeavouring to recover Savoy, and, perhaps, aſſiſt Lyons.

An emiſſary, the abbe A——, from Turin, an old acquaintance of Simon's the patriot, of Savoy, (who eighteen months before had been executed in effigy at Chamberry on account of his patriotiſm) made the following overtures to Simon, who communicated them to the committee of public ſafety. *Firſt*, That the provinces he had loſt ſhould be reſtored to the king of Sardinia. *Second*, That he ſhould be gratified with twenty millions of money; or, if that could not be furniſhed, that the French crown-jewels ſhould be depoſited with him as ſecurity for that ſum. If France ſhould comply with theſe conditions, the king of Sardinia promiſed, on his part, to withdraw from the league againſt France; to allow the French troops free paſſage through his dominions into Italy; and to furniſh twelve thouſand of his beſt troops, of which fifteen hundred ſhould be cavalry, to aſſiſt the French either in France or in Italy; and for which France was to pay the ſame annual ſubſidy, of 200,000l. ſterling, as England had hitherto done. Such was the ſubſtance of the treaty which was propoſed to

us by the king of Sardinia's emiſſary, and to which we pretended to liſten, merely, as has been already obſerved, to gain time; and this we did that Lyons might be reduced before the Sardinians even ſuſpected that we were only amuſing them. When they diſcovered it to a certainty, the only means they had of gratifying their revenge, was by throwing the poor abbe A—— into a dungeon, for not having more penetration than themſelves to dive into our intentions.

## AUSTRIA.

ONE of the many curſes attending the reign of Louis the XVIth was his intimate connexion with the perfidious houſe of Auſtria, in which all the advantages of the union centred, while France ſuſtained all the loſſes. It loſt by this fooliſh connexion all its antient alliances except Spain; all its political influence, for the eſtabliſhment of which ſo much French blood had been ſpilt, and ſo much treaſure ſpent, from the time of the great

great cardinal Richelieu down to the days of that old bigotted fool cardinal Fleury, who, though ſtupid and ignorant, had yet ſenſe enough to ſee, that an alliance between France and Auſtria was unnatural and impolitic, ſince it muſt divide the political importance of France; a diviſion which could not but be favourable to Auſtria, who, with leſs right, might be able to treat France as France has treated Spain, or, perhaps, worſe, —as Ruſſia has treated Poland.

So long as the Imperial dignity is poſſeſſed by the houſe of Auſtria; ſo long as that houſe poſſeſſes Lombardy and Mantua, and ſome part of Flanders and Brabant, and that Tuſcany is governed by one of its branches, it is not, to the beſt of my judgement, for the intereſt or the dignity of France, to have any nearer alliance with Auſtria than with England; becauſe in ſuch an alliance Auſtria can never be ſincere. Alſace, Lorrain, and French Flanders, are too deſirable poſſeſſions for her not to ſeize the firſt favourable opportunity of invading and re-conquering them: this has been ſufficiently proved in the preſent war, not to ſpeak of former wars; and ſo inveterate is the hatred of Auſtria to France, that it has even

even made her for a moment forget her enmity to the king of Pruſſia, and offer him a participation in the ſpoils of France, in order to prevent the miſcarriage of thoſe deep laid ſchemes concerted between Auſtria and England for partitioning France. Should future ages believe in miracles, the eſcape of France from this deſtruction will be conſidered as miraculous, and not aſcribed to its real cauſe, —the ability of its government, and the bravery of its ſoldiers,—of Frenchmen.

The conduct of Auſtria at the preſent period is exactly what it ever has been, and ever will be. The great king of Sweden, Guſtavus Adolphus, ſaved Germany from the fetters of Auſtria 160 years ago; and the French popular government has now ſaved Frenchmen from Auſtrian ſlavery. The attempts of Auſtria are the ſame now as they were 160 years ago, and they will continue the ſame for centuries to come.

By its impolitic alliance with Auſtria France has ceded its place on the political ſtage of Europe; that of being regarded, reſpected, and dreaded, as the firſt power: a place to which the ſituation of France, its population, its reſources, and the enterprizing

ſpirit

ſpirit of Frenchmen give it a right to pretend to, indeed to command. Frederick the IId, the great king of Pruſſia, ſaid, that if he were king of France he would not permit or pardon the firing a gun from one extremity of Europe to the other: none but a fool would venture to contradict what has been aſſerted by ſo able a judge.

When peace takes place the connexion between France and Auſtria will be exactly on the ſame footing as in the year 1746; theſe powers will be neither farther or nearer in point of union. Then the Turks, the Danes, the Swedes, and what ſhall remain of the Poles, will be ſaved from the Ruſſian yoke: and Venice, and all the Italian and German petty ſtates, will have nothing to apprehend from the deſigns of Auſtria. Then Pruſſia will, no doubt, form ſuch ties of friendſhip with France as will break the power of England in Holland, and thus the Dutch will owe to the French the preſervation of ſuch of their trade as ſhall have eſcaped the rapacity of the Engliſh.

Before I finiſh this article I cannot help making an obſervation, which ſhews at once the power and genius of the fair ſex in France,

and

and the injuſtice of the ſalic law. Two women, or rather the intrigues of two women, formed the connexion between France and Auſtria: and two other women occaſioned its diſſolution. Maria Thereſa, and madame Pompadour with the aſſiſtance of her *bon ami*, the abbe, ſince cardinal Bernis, brought it about: and meſdames Necker and Roland, by their influence over their huſbands and other *bons amis*, brought on the revolution, and the war, which diſſolved it.

## *Secret Negociation, under my Direction, with Auſtria.*

WHEN the Engliſh were driven from before Dunkirk, and the Auſtrians apprehended that their military deſigns upon Maubeuge would be equally unſucceſsful, count Mettenich ſent a French patriot, an inhabitant of Valenciennes, to negociate, not for the liberty of Maria Antonietta, the Emperor's aunt, and her children; no, it was for the ſurrender of Maubeuge, in exchange for the four members of the convention, and the late miniſter Bour-

Bournonville, delivered to Cobourg by the infamous traitor Dumourier.

It is impoſſible to comprehend how Auſtria could make ſuch an offer at a time when, by ſending all the Briſſotins to a ſcaffold or a priſon, the French government evidently ſhewed that it had more members in the convention than it wanted. For my part, I wiſhed there had been four hundred, inſtead of four, deputies in the Auſtrian dungeons; and had that been the caſe they ſhould all have died there, if their liberation had depended upon me. The only anſwer, therefore, to this propoſal was, orders to Jourdain to raiſe the ſiege of Maubeuge, which he effected on the very day that the revolutionary tribunal, agreeably to our orders, ſent Maria Antonietta to the ſcaffold. Thus terminated this intended Auſtrian negociation, which, in order to ſave the lives and property of the family of the patriot whom we entruſted on the occaſion, and to avoid diſcouraging more advantageous negociations in future, the French government have kept a profound ſecret.

NAPLES.

## NAPLES.

WHEN France placed a Spaniſh prince upon the throne of the two Sicilies it was not ſuppoſed that an Auſtrian princeſs, and her favourite miniſter, a renegado Engliſhman, ſhould one day have power and cunning enough to make that ſame prince the inveterate enemy of Frenchmen: his conduct, however, ſince the year 1793, has proved this to be the fact; and if his *gratitude* has not been diſplayed by doing ſtill more harm to France, it was leſs from want of will than power.

If the French government had not been very weak in December 1792, the city of Naples had now preſented a ſcene of ruins; and the Neapolitans and Sicilians, become free men, been by this time ſinging hymns to liberty inſtead of the virgin, even in Rome itſelf. But I now fear, ſince the diſaſter of our fleet at Toulon, that the Engliſh will be too powerful in the Mediterranean, at leaſt during the

preſent war, to allow us ſuch another opportunity of revenge as that which occurred in 1792, unleſs we ſhould be able to get the Spaniards to join us.

It is the intereſt of France to exclude, as much as poſſible, the Engliſh from the profitable trade to the Levant and Mediterranean; and as this cannot be effected without forming treaties of amity and commerce, ſuch treaties muſt be formed at any rate; even, if other means fail, by giving larger ſubſidies than any other country can offer. Such treaties England may however, perhaps, force the maritime ſtates of Italy to break, while her fleet continues powerful and victorious; it is therefore more abſolutely neceſſary to have a ſtronger fleet at Toulon than at Breſt, from whence it is my opinion, that as ſoon as the damages received in the laſt action are repaired, twenty ſhips of the line, at leaſt, ſhould be diſpatched to join the Toulon fleet. If it were poſſible to depend on the ability and courage of our naval officers, we might, by bringing this force unexpectedly into the Mediterranean, either capture, ſeparate, or defeat, if united, the Engliſh and Spaniſh fleets in that ſea: and if that were accompliſhed,

pliſhed, the throne of the two Sicilies ſhould be levelled with that of France; and popular governments eſtabliſhed in its place, and in the places of all other governments in Italy, which the French navy or army can conquer: and as the exiſtence of theſe new governments will depend on the protection which France ſhall be able or willing to afford them, it will be their intereſt to form with her the cloſeſt poſſible connexion. Thus would the trade of England in theſe parts be effectually ruined; and the Auſtrian family, and Auſtrian power be baniſhed for ever, to make way for the power of France, to which alone the Italians would be indebted for their liberty.

Many unforeſeen accidents may, however, prevent this ſcheme from taking effect: it is therefore the true intereſt of France to forget, for the preſent, thoſe injuries which it cannot at preſent revenge, and ſeek every opportunity of negociating with Naples and all the other maritime powers in Italy: and if at a general pacification the Italian ſtates ſhould retain the ſame maſters and the ſame governments which they had before the war, the intereſt of France requires her to form the moſt intimate union with the court of Naples,

as one of the moſt powerful in Italy, and the beſt able to prevent the encroachments of Auſtria on the territories of the Pope or the Venetians.

I have had no ſecret negociation with the court of Naples ſince I came to the head of the French government, but my agents have had ſeveral with its ſubjects; ſhould I periſh before theſe are carried into execution, I owe it to my country not to divulge them.

In 1792 this court, however, according to the diplomatic diſpatches which I have ſeen, intereſted itſelf for the three priſoners of the Capet family confined in the temple; it even offered to ranſom them with money, and to place the revenues of Naples, for the period agreed upon, in the hands of French agents or farmers-general.

Whether the court of Naples had, or had not any real meaning in theſe offers I cannot tell; but it is a fact, that no other court, except that of Sweden, took any meaſures for procuring Louis the XVIth, and his family, their liberty.

## THE ECCLESIASTICAL STATES.

HAD I been at the head of the French government in 1792, his holineſs the Pope would, in all probability, have been obliged to change the triple crown for the jacobin red cap of liberty: and his Madona at Loretto, with its treaſury, have once more made a pilgrimage, not through the air, or by the conveyance of angels, as formerly, but by ſea or land, as ſhould be found convenient, under the eſcort of free Frenchmen, to the mint at Paris.

As the Pope, however, has the government of a rich corn country, with tolerable good ſea ports at Civita Vecchia, and Ancona, it is the intereſt of France to court his friendſhip as long as his power exiſts, that they may bring home, in French bottoms, the corn which the Venetians and Genoeſe have hitherto, eſpecially ſince the war, brought from the Pope's dominions to France, and for which they have charged the French government too large brokerage.

It is very poſſible that the world will have the misfortune of not ſeeing many more Popes, as the Catholic religion is growing out of vogue. Whenever there ceaſes to be a Pope, Auſtria, either alone, if it dares, or in conjunction with Venice and the court of Naples, will take poſſeſſion of, and divide the Eccleſiaſtical States now annexed to the popedom. This France muſt prepare to prevent, by forming alliances; as it is equally the intereſt of France, though no longer Catholic or Chriſtian, that a Pope ſhould reſide at Rome, and enjoy, for the preſent, his wonted power, as that the Grand Signor ſhould continue, for the preſent, to reſide at Conſtantinople.

I have had no ſecret negociations with the governments of the Eccleſiaſtical States; but the Pope, or ſome body in his name, favoured me laſt month with a letter of penitence, or warning, as it was called. In it I was deſired to re-eſtabliſh the Roman Catholic religion, or rather to reſtore to their property and functions, thoſe biſhops and prieſts who had not taken the national oath: if I did this heaven was promiſed to me, however numerous or great my ſins; but if I did not, the hotteſt

hotteſt place in hell was to be my lot. His holineſs condeſcended to ſay in this addreſs, that the miſery of France and its inhabitants was only a prelude to what they were to ſuffer in another world, as the puniſhment of their crimes, eſpecially that of ſhedding the blood of the royal family; a crime which it was impoſſible heaven could ever forgive.

To this I replied, with all the reſpect due to his holineſs, that as to the blood of the royal family, the ſacrifice of it ſeemed particularly pleaſing to heaven, ſince on the day in which Maria Antonietta was beheaded, it permitted the French army to beat the Auſtrian before Maubeuge; and the day that Elizabeth Capet was guillotined, it bleſſed us with another victory over our enemies, and permitted us to take Courtray and eſtabliſh ourſelves there: and if the Catholic religion, I obſerved, was the favourite of heaven, heaven had the power, no doubt, to eſtabliſh it in France, and every where elſe, without the aſſiſtance of men. As I received no anſwer to this letter, I ſuppoſe all correſpondence between me and the Pope is ended.

## VENICE.

THE romantic quixotiſms in the politics of this ſtate are more laughable than dangerous, either to France or the reſt of Europe. It is, however, the intereſt of France to keep on friendly terms, and even to be in alliance with the republic of Venice, both in order to prevent the Auſtrians becoming too powerful in that part of Italy, and the Engliſh from monopolizing the trade in the Adriatic ſea, over which this ſtate (as long as it pleaſes the maritime powers of Europe) will poſſeſs, or fancy it poſſeſſes, the ſovereignty. But if the intereſt of France requires an alliance with Venice, the ſafety of Venice requires an alliance with France. In its preſent ſtate, without ſoldiers to defend its territory by land, or a fleet to guard it by ſea, half a dozen French or Engliſh privateers might otherwiſe, in the ſpace of one week, conquer and plunder the whole Venetian ſtate.

That ſuch is the ſituation of Venice is a fact known to all Europe: yet when the war broke

broke out, its deliberations, whether it ſhould remain neutral or not, were ſo numerous, ſo great, ſo agitated, ſo ſubtilized and contra-ſubtilized, that had the ſtate been as powerful as England itſelf, it could not have ſhewed a greater deſire to impreſs France with a belief of its prodigious importance when it declared its neutrality, and received the reward of it; neither of which was done with the beſt grace; and this France may one day remember.

I have had no ſecret tranſactions with this ſtate: but had it not been prudent enough to maintain its neutrality, the French government would certainly have accepted the many offers of aſſiſtance and friendſhip made by the non-noble inhabitants of Venice and its territories.

It is a curious fact, that from no part of Europe has France received ſo many offers and projects of conſpiracy and rebellion as from Italy, and that prieſts have been at the head of moſt of them. This too has happened ſince the deſtruction of the Catholic religion in France, and while its central point ſtill remained untouched in Italy; a convincing proof of the hypocriſy which prevails in that country, and that many who are obliged

to

to kiſs the Pope's feet, would much ſooner, if they dared to follow their inclination, ſpit in his face as the tyrant of their conſciences.

## TYROL, MILAN, MANTUA, TUSCANY, AND SOME OTHER STATES.

AS all theſe ſtates and countries are either governed by the emperor himſelf, or by princes of the Auſtrian family, what I have ſaid under the head of Auſtria is applicable to them. The grand duke of Tuſcany, however, or rather Manfredini his miniſter, was very unwilling to renounce, as he was compelled to do by Engliſh deſpotiſm, the neutrality he was diſpoſed to obſerve, and to which it is his intereſt to return, as ſoon as poſſible, in order to prevent Tuſcany from being conquered, or, at leaſt, plundered by the French republicans. At the ſame time it is alſo the intereſt of the French not to be too ſevere towards this country, if it ſhould be conquered by them; but to levy all their contributions on the property of the grand duke, the nobles, the

the prieſts, and the Engliſh merchants who are ſettled at Leghorn: and as Manfredini poſſeſſes the confidence of the grand duke, and deteſts the Engliſh, France muſt by no means loſe the advantages ſhe may derive from theſe circumſtances.

*Secret Negociations reſpecting Tyrol, Milan, and Mantua.*

TO protect France from the influence of Auſtrian intrigue, and to keep the houſe of Auſtria at a diſtance from the French frontiers, it is to be wiſhed, whenever a peace takes place, that the Rhine may be one of the French boundaries, and the Alps, or Italy, and Tyrol with Bavaria, the other.

We may probably accompliſh the firſt by force of arms, but to effect the laſt we muſt negociate as well as fight.

I have lately, with the conſent of government, ſent an agent of mine with an offer to the emigrant brothers of Louis the XVIth to conquer for them the Tyrol, the Milaneſe, and Mantua, and to re-eſtabliſh the old kingdom

dom of Lombardy, on condition that France ſhould retain her conqueſts in the kingdom of Sardinia, and have free paſſage for her troops through that kingdom into Lombardy; and that, as a compenſation to the king of Sardinia for his loſs, he ſhould have an equivalent from the territories of Geneva, or from Lombardy. Should they conſent to my propoſal, 150,000 Frenchmen ſhall ſoon make this conqueſt; and as theſe Frenchmen may, with propriety, be drawn from La Vendee, and other departments of loyaliſts, France may by this means be purged of the friends of the Bourbons, who will never be permitted to enter France again; and the late French princes, at the expence of Auſtria, will then eſtabliſh a kingdom, which Auſtria wiſhed to eſtabliſh for them at the expence of the freedom of Frenchmen.

As I have yet no news from my agent about the ſucceſs of this propoſal, I ſhall not be at preſent more explicit; but ſhould it ſucceed, there is no doubt of its cauſing the downfal of Auſtrian power.

MODENA,

## MODENA, PARMA, &c.

THESE petty ſtates are of no conſequence to France under their preſent princes; but if any of theſe ſhould die without heirs, it is the intereſt of France to prevent the ſtates from being annexed to the ſtate of any of the Italian princes. She muſt inſiſt on each of theſe ſtates having always a ſeparate prince, of any family in Europe except Auſtria and Bourbon.

The former ſubſidies, or rather alms, from France, are by no means to be continued to theſe ſtates, as they were only charities from the kings of France to their beggarly relations in Italy.

## GENOA.

THE Genoeſe are much more merchants than republicans, and therefore every one, from the doge to the cobler, is to be bought;

or, I ſhould rather ſay, every one ſells his intereſt, his ſentiments, and his influence.

In time of war the neutrality of this ſtate is always advantageous to France, and generally enriches the Genoeſe themſelves. Yet, true as is the laſt fact, vaſt ſums have been expended in out-bidding England, and perſuading the Genoeſe to attend to their intereſt and obſerve neutrality.

With Auſtria on one ſide, and Sardinia on the other, France has always hitherto preſerved Genoa from becoming a prey to one or other of theſe potentates; but Genoa has not always acknowledged the obligation as it ought. If therefore the exiſtence of Genoa, as an independent ſtate, was not neceſſary to France, it ſhould ſoon be left to its fate; but as a city of great trade, having a good harbour, and almoſt at the doors of France, its alliance, or neutrality, muſt ſtill be purchaſed, whenever they are required.

TURKY.

## TURKY.

THE falſe policy of France in abandoning this old and natural ally for Auſtria, has cauſed all the great loſſes which the Turks have ſuſtained for upwards of thirty years paſt; and the preſent French government is required, by duty, honour, and intereſt, to repair the political blunder of the two laſt kings, and their miniſters, by uniting itſelf as cloſely as poſſible with the ſultan, not only by a treaty of offenſive and defenſive alliance, but even convince the Turks by a ſubſidy that France will not ſpare its treaſure to preſerve them from the coloſſal power of the ambitious tygreſs of the north, and her Auſtrian ally.

But as money alone cannot revive the former warlike genius of the Turks, French officers muſt be ſent to diſcipline the Turkiſh ſoldiers, and French carpenters to work with and inſtruct them in their dock-yards. And in order to remove ſpies, and terminate the confuſion which at preſent reigns in Conſtanti-

nople (which may be juſtly ſtiled the modern military Babylon; where French, Engliſh, Swediſh, Daniſh, Pruſſian, Poliſh, and Italian adventurers engage to teach that to the Turks with which they are themſelves unacquainted) all foreigners ſtiling themſelves officers, Frenchmen only excepted, muſt be immediately diſmiſſed and ordered to quit Conſtantinople; and of this it is hoped the Turkiſh miniſters will ſee the neceſſity, when they are poſitively aſſured that a French dancing-maſter took upon him during the laſt Ruſſian war, to teach the Turks the management of artillery; while, at the ſame period, an Italian dentiſt had the aſſurance to give leſſons in the ſame ſcience, and command as chief engineer.

To preſerve the advantageous commerce of the Levant, which cannot be done if Ruſſia gets footing of any conſequence in the Mediterranean, and even to prevent the ſouth of Europe from being overrun by a new race of barbarians, more dangerous to the liberty of mankind than were the Goths and Vandals, becauſe they are better diſciplined and better governed, it is abſolutely neceſſary that France ſhould not conſider any ſacrifice as too great

by which ſhe can ſecure the friendſhip of Turky, ſince poſterity, if not the preſent generation, muſt reap immenſe advantage from it, though at preſent it may be looked upon as an object of little importance.

While the Turks and Frenchmen are ſincerely united Auſtria will never dare to leave her extenſive Turkiſh frontiers without a numerous army to defend them. This will leſſen the number of thoſe mercenaries which it vomits forth to oppreſs Germany; and the Poliſh patriots may then once more, and not in vain, implore the protection of the Turks againſt their Chriſtian neighbours. Advantages would alſo reſult from ſuch an event to Sweden, Denmark, and Pruſſia, upon which more ſhall be ſaid in its proper place.

However oppoſite may be the intereſt of France and England in all other reſpects it muſt here concur: and the Engliſh muſt approve of the French preventing the ruin of the Turkiſh and the increaſe of the Ruſſian power, and this the conduct of Pitt, in 1791, very clearly ſhews.

*Secret Negociations, under my Direction, with Turky.*

HAD England employed a tenth part of the wealth ſhe expended at Toulon in bribing the Turkiſh miniſters, there is no doubt but the Turks, to their own ruin, had weakened themſelves by joining the grand confederacy againſt France; but whether deep policy, or mean avarice, governed the Engliſh cabinet on this occaſion cannot eaſily be determined. The poor ability, with reſpect to money, of the ambaſſador of one of the pooreſt countries in Europe, was ſufficient to turn the ſcale at Conſtantinople and induce the Turks to reſolve on a neutrality. As to the French agent, then at the Ottoman port, he choſe rather to ſecure to his own uſe the money and preſents ſent from France for the Turkiſh miniſters, than to employ them as he was ordered. His conduct is not ſurprizing, for he had been a French marquis; but it is wonderful that any popular French government would employ this man who had before

conducted

conducted himself in a very equivocal manner at Warsaw.

Since I have been at the head of the French government, men, not only of ability but probity, have been employed at Constantinople, and their influence is at present so great, that if any means could be devised for preventing a Russian war ensuing in consequence, Austria should soon have reason to repent of her having left Hungary almost without any other soldiers, besides the French prisoners there, and at a time too, when, I have private reasons for believing, the Hungarians themselves would not be averse to receiving the assistance of the Turks for throwing off the Austrian yoke.

## POLAND.

THE ruin of this state, or rather its annihilation, is another consequence of the alliance between France and Austria. But weak as Poland is at present, it is the interest of France to keep up the flame of general

revolt, now burning there, and which was kindled only by Poliſh patriotiſm.

Not to ſpeak of the future advantages which may reſult to France from the Poliſh inſurrection, it will at preſent oblige Ruſſia, Pruſſia, and Auſtria to maintain, upon the frontiers of Poland, large armies, which might otherwiſe be employed againſt the French. Beſides, the ſpirit of liberty may penetrate the boſoms of the ſlaves, or ſubjects of the ſtates bordering on Poland, and the north of Europe, all at once follow the example of France.

As the ſituation of Poland prevents France from furniſhing it with any other than pecuniary ſuccours, it muſt neglect no opportunity of ſending theſe; and by doing ſo France will acquire the means of exciting future inſurrections, if the preſent ſhould not ſucceed; for the Poliſh patriots have always been grateful, and looked up to France only for protection and ſuccour in all their civil commotions, at leaſt from the time that Ruſſia forced Poniatowſki upon them for their king.

*Secret Negociation, under my Direction, with Poland.*

SINCE I have had any power in France, it has been my conſtant wiſh to rouſe the Poliſh patriots from their ſlumbers: I almoſt deſpaired of ſucceeding when the heretofore abbe Le B—— pointed out to me the traitor and emigrant, ex-general D——, as a perſon who, in order to inſinuate himſelf into my favour, and move again in his proper element, intrigue, would undoubtedly accept of an employment not attended with any perſonal danger to himſelf. Le B—— found out D——, who did not heſitate to promiſe the completion of my wiſhes. This D—— had, in the time of Louis the XVth, been employed in Poland, and was perſonally acquainted with many Poliſh patriots; and to remove all doubt of his being now employed by the preſent French government, regular powers were ſent him.

What D—— had promiſed he performed; and while the foreign as well as the French

news-papers were full of accounts of his being in Switzerland and other places, he was in fact at Dreſden, and there laid the foundation of the preſent Poliſh inſurrection. After every thing had been arranged at Dreſden, Le B—— met, at Geneva, two diſtinguiſhed Poliſh patriots, who ſet the laſt hand to the treaty, and received part of the ſubſidy; becauſe, as I knew the character of D——, I never truſted the money to paſs through his hands, leſt he ſhould veſt it in foreign ſecurities for his own uſe, and then with baſeneſs, not uncuſtomary with him, diſcover his own plot in order to get money from the oppoſite party. D—— however received for his ſervices a gratuity of 2000 louis d'ors, with permiſſion to return to France as ſoon as a general pacification ſhould take place; but he is too cunning ever to ſet his foot again on the French territories, as he well knows, that, under a revolutionary government, means would be readily found of ſending him to make the exit he ſo well deſerves upon a ſcaffold.

## SWITZERLAND.

NO nation has been more inſulted, or more cruelly treated by the French revolution than the Swiſs. The government ſhewed, in Auguſt 1792, ſome diſpoſition for vengeance; it was, however, ſoon diſcovered by the agents of France, that its deſire was rather to revenge the unpaid ſubſidies, than the loſs of its citizen's blood. Money was therefore ſent to pay up the arrears, and Switzerland remained neutral; but not until its neutrality was dearly ſold and dearly bought.

With this country it is the intereſt of France to renew all its former treaties, however diſadvantageous they may appear at firſt view. Switzerland will always ſell its ſubjects, and its ſubjects will always be ſold; it is therefore more advantageous for France to renew its former bargain, than permit the Swiſs to be purchaſed by her enemies.

With ſuch a venal nation as this, France may always, by the mean of money, do any

thing which the intereſt of the moment requires: but for the preſent neither more or leſs is neceſſary than ſimply to renew our former treaties.

*Secret Negotiations, under my Direction, with Switzerland.*

THROUGH the generous, perhaps the too profuſe, diſtribution of money by the French agents in this country, the Swiſs government has been induced not only perfectly to forget all its former complaints, but even to hint that it was diſpoſed to believe the conduct of the Swiſs regiments, in the French ſervice, to have deſerved the treatment they received from the French patriots.

As we were on ſuch good terms, I lately ordered B—— to propoſe a new capitulation for Swiſs ſoldiers, to the number of 15,000 men, all to be quartered in or near Paris, and to form the guard of the government, which I hope ſoon to eſtabliſh on the ruins of the convention and the committees. More objections have

have been made in Switzerland to this propoſal than I expected: but as France will ſoon have opportunity of forwarding to Switzerland more *weighty arguments*, I do not doubt of ſucceeding in the end.

I do not know whether it ariſes from want of ſpirit or from a falſe principle of honour; but it is an undeniable fact, that when a Swiſs is once bought he becomes faithful to his maſter or maſters; and, indifferent whether it is the pope of Rome, the ſtadtholder of Holland, or the king of Spain, or whether he fights for or againſt liberty, he preſerves his fidelity to his purchaſer, provided his pay does not run too far in arrears; a fact, which the conduct of the Swiſs ſoldiers in all ſtates, and particularly of thoſe lately in the pay of Louis the XVIth evidently proves.

Had Louis profited, as he might and ſhould have done, of this temper of his Swiſs troops, he might ſtill have remained upon the throne; fortunately he did not; but, ſhould B—— ſucceed in the negociation confided to him, I may one day be able to ſhew the world that I know better how to take advantage of this purchaſed fidelity of the Swiſs ſoldiery.

## PORTUGAL.

IF the Portugueſe nation had the ſame ſpirit now that it had one hundred and fifty years ſince, it would find the Engliſh yoke as heavy at this day as the Spaniſh yoke was then, and throw it off at once: but as long as the Portugueſe cabinet is abſolutely governed by that of Great Britain, and that a paſſion for every thing that is Engliſh rages even more than ever in the army and the navy, in the church and the exchange, ſuch a revolution cannot be expected. Neither is it to be ſuppoſed, that as France cannot offer the ſame advantages in trade as England does for the productions of this country, the wines and fruits of France excelling thoſe of Portugal, any nearer connection can be formed between France and Portugal than that which ſubſiſted before the breaking out of the preſent war. But if France ſhould ſucceed in detaching Spain from its preſent alliance with England, and renew her former treaties with that power, the Spaniſh cabinet, in conſequence

ſequence of the relationſhip between the reigning families, may be able to cool, by degrees, the intimacy now ſubſiſting between the courts of London and Liſbon; and may even irritate the people againſt the Engliſh by repreſenting, in its true colours, the affront put upon the Portugueſe nation at large, by ſuffering ſo many Britiſh ſubjects to be not only at the head of the trade of the country, but to hold high rank, as officers, in the army and navy of Portugal.

The Portugueſe government has the ſame right to increaſe the duty on the exportation of its wines, that England has already taken of raiſing that on the importation or conſumption of theſe wines in England. The people of Great Britain are ſo much accuſtomed to the uſe of Port wines, that they would not ceaſe to drink them though the price ſhould be advanced from 2s. 6d. to 3s. 6d. per bottle. But ſuppoſe the Portugueſe government ſhould, from the fear of leſſening the demand for their wines, be afraid of increaſing the export duty, ſtill the intereſt of Portugal requires an augmentation of the duty on the importation of Engliſh productions and manufactures; as it would not only leſſen the

great annual exportation of gold from Portugal to England, but encourage diſcontented Britiſh ſubjects and others, to aſſiſt the Portugueſe in eſtabliſhing manufacturies for fabricating thoſe articles which now lay ſo heavy a contribution upon Portugal; and for the making of which in that country there is now no encouragement, ſince the privileges there enjoyed by the Engliſh enable them to ſell ſuch goods cheaper than they can be manufactured by the Portugueſe themſelves.

Portugal may find in many other countries beſides England the manufactured commodities ſhe wants; but it is in Portugal alone that England can ſeek the wines ſhe muſt have. In a word, Portugal would be better without the productions of England; but England can never, coſt what they will, do without the productions of Portugal.

Should Spain or France be happy enough by theſe and other obſervation to perſuade Portugal of her real intereſt, a time may come when the Engliſh will be no longer, what they have been for fifty years paſt, the ſame deſpots upon the Tagus as the Thames.

No ſecret tranſactions have, during my time, taken place with this country.

RUSSIA.

## RUSSIA.

THIS country and its government, which one hundred years ago had little more political influence in the affairs of Europe than the emperor of Morocco has at preſent, is now certainly, next to France, the moſt powerful ſtate; and its daily increaſing ſtrength ſhould be more ſtrictly watched and dreaded by all governments than even the power of France itſelf.

Ruſſia owes the diſcipline of its numerous armies to the inſtruction of Swediſh officers made priſoners by Peter the Firſt, whom that fortunate tyrant compelled, in order to ſave their own lives, to fight, or, at leaſt, to teach his ſoldiers to fight againſt their countrymen during his long wars with Charles XII. The Ruſſian navy owes its exiſtence to Engliſh workmen, ſent to Ruſſia by their government to create a naval force, which may one day be able to cruſh, or aſſiſt other powers in cruſhing, the formidable and deſpotic

navy

navy of England itſelf. And that England has ſuch treatment to apprehend is evident, from the conduct of Ruſſia towards her in the American war; not to ſpeak of its ingratitude to the Poles, who aſſiſted the Ruſſians in ruining the Swedes, to whom Ruſſia owed its army. The Poles themſelves may, in their turn aſcribe, to the alliance they formed with Peter the Firſt, all their misfortunes, troubles, calamities, and partitions of their country ſince that period.

Ruſſia fears the rival power of France too much ever to be her ſincere ally. It requires no great genius to perceive this; and yet, after blundering into an alliance with Auſtria, an alliance with Ruſſia ſeemed almoſt inevitable, as the intereſts of Ruſſia and Auſtria, ſo long as the Turks have any thing more in Europe to loſe, will be the ſame; that is to enrich themſelves by the ſpoils of Turky, which the former has done, and the latter would have done had not the revolution in France ſuggeſted hopes of plundering that country inſtead of Turky.

Since all the ties of this alliance are happily broken by the preſent war, it is the intereſt of France to let them remain ſo for ever.

And

And it is a duty which liberty, which the welfare of the world impoſes upon the French, to be as attentive to, and as jealous of the land forces of Ruſſia as the navy of England; and to do every thing in its power to diminiſh and deſtroy both the one and the other.

Though Ruſſia has ſince the revolution, and eſpecially ſince the war broke out, cut off all immediate communication and commercial connection with France, (a meaſure adopted not only to pleaſe England but to prevent the importation of revolutionary principles with other French productions) it is very probable that at the death of Catherine a rebellion may break out which will cauſe revolutions and confuſion. Should ſuch an event take place it will be abſolutely neceſſary for the French government to ſpare no expence which may enable the Turks, the Swedes, and the Poles, to take advantage of the moment, for recovering thoſe provinces of which Ruſſia has plundered them ſince the commencement of the preſent century; and in which, no doubt, the king of Pruſſia would undoubtedly aſſiſt them, if the Poles would fairly cede to him thoſe provinces which he already occupies; and that the Swedes would,

in exchange for Livonia and Ruſſian Finland, reſign to him their part of Pomerania, which is more expenſive than uſeful to them, but would be of great advantage to the Pruſſian monarch.

The Ruſſian power is ſo much more to be dreaded as being in the hands of very able miniſters. Markoff, the preſent factotum, has, by his conduct during the war, ſhewn himſelf not unworthy to ſucceed a Panin and old Oſterman.

Though Ruſſia has declared againſt France, ſhe has not aſſiſted any one power at war with it, except by her advice and promiſes; unleſs, perhaps, ſome pecuniary charity to the French princes; in return for which the ableſt emigrants, both of the navy and artillery, have been ſent to her. Ruſſia has with pleaſure ſeen all the other ſtates exhauſt themſelves both in men and money, in the ſame proportion as ſhe recovers and recruits both her army and treaſury.

By the impolitic treaties of ſome of the belligerent powers, England and Auſtria, Ruſſia has already in her poſſeſſion plauſible pretences for attacking, whenever ſhe pleaſes, the Turks, the Swedes, and the Danes; ſince they have

preferred

preferred neutrality to war, which the inſolent pride of Auſtria and England would not permit, and therefore preferred putting it into the power of Catherine to ruin both, and, perhaps, all Europe in its turn, ſhould ſhe live long enough for the purpoſe, rather than ſuffer theſe independent ſtates to diſobey their deſpotiſm.

The Poles, it is true, are now in revolt againſt Ruſſia, which may cauſe her ſome uneaſineſs; but I am ſorry to ſay this is not likely to continue long, unleſs the king of Pruſſia ſhould make peace with France and join the Poliſh patriots; and this I apprehend will be prevented by his Engliſh alliance, and ſtill more by his Engliſh ſubſidies.

With Ruſſia no ſecret negociation would have been accepted by me if ſuch had been propoſed, which it was not.

Many ſtates of Europe have complained of what they have been pleaſed to call my tyranny: but let them compare the deeds of Catherine with mine:—of Catherine, in full poſſeſſion of all the power her ambition can wiſh; quietly occupying a throne, from which no factions, no enemies, either domeſtic or foreign, can remove her; let them then

remember her right to that throne; the criminal act which placed her on it; and the unnatural one that enables her to remain ſeated there. Let them then recollect all her crimes, from the murder of her huſband, to the preſent ſlavery of the Poliſh patriots in Siberia. Let them compare theſe deeds I ſay with mine;—with what neceſſity, evident from the well-known character of Frenchmen, obliges me to do; not to ſatisfy ambition or a thirſt of blood, but merely to ſecure myſelf: let them compare all theſe with impartiality, and the compariſon will be in my favour.

Amidſt continual civil troubles it is impoſſible to judge of the real character of a man in my ſituation. Cromwell was thought to be a patriot, yet, when the government was fixed, he became a tyrant: but ſhould I live to ſee my government fixed, I have no doubt that the preſent age and future times will acknowledge me a true patriot, who have only taken advantage of the circumſtances of the times more than my competitors did.

## SWEDEN.

IT was an unpardonable fault in the French government, in 1788, not to aſſiſt more effectually in his war with Ruſſia, the late king of Sweden, who, I muſt confeſs, however hoſtile he ſhewed himſelf to the French revolution, was an able politician and a brave and great general. An opportunity of humbling Ruſſia was then ſuffered to paſs by, which will not, I am afraid, occur again, with all its favourable circumſtances, for a long time. With only a trifling ſubſidy from Spain and England, and no other aſſiſtance but the few means he found in his own country, Guſtavus the IIId cauſed the omnipotent Catherine to tremble for her own capital; which undoubtedly would have been taken, had not her miniſters employed more money and intrigue than ſoldiers, to oppoſe the honeſt unſuſpecting Swedes, always brave and always fond of liberty, but too uninformed to know that the liberty offered by tyrants is nothing but ſlavery.

For near two hundred and fifty years France has been, with very little interruption, in alliance with Sweden, and has not been a loſer by it, though obliged to pay a ſubſidy. To her alliance with Sweden France is ſolely indebted, as well as for ſome other advantages, for the peace of Weſtphalia. But France has in her turn protected Sweden from becoming another Poland, by planning the revolution of 1772, which put an end to all the civil troubles of that country.

Though the ſtrength of Sweden is not great, and its reſources are but few, an alliance with it is not only uſeful, but neceſſary to France, in the preſent ſituation of Europe. A ſubſidy of ſome few millions to Sweden will prove of more real advantage to France than all the immenſe ſums of money ſpent in bribing Switzerland, and ſome paltry Italian ſtates; as it is from the docks and arſenals of Carlſcrone and Swenborg that France may, in ſome meaſure, repair the damage, cauſed by treachery, at Toulon.

I muſt not forget to mention, to the honour of Sweden, that I have never found it infringing any of its treaties with France, whatever cauſe it had to complain of us. After

giving

giving ſuch an example of public faith for centuries, I think its future engagements are to be depended upon, which is not the caſe with ſome other powers to whom France is obliged to pay ſubſidies for their alliance.

It is no doubt the favourite ſcheme of Ruſſia to get poſſeſſion of Swediſh Finland, whoſe vicinity to Peterſbourg makes it ſo much more deſirable to the voracious Catherine: and as ſhe poſſeſſes power ſufficient to carry it into execution, an alliance between France, Turkey, and Sweden, is the only mean of preventing its ſucceſs. Of this the preſent Swediſh cabinet are ſenſible; and by its conduct towards France ſince the war, ſhews how high a value it ſet upon its late French connection. The French government muſt not, on its part, fail to renew this connection with Sweden, as ſoon as it can be done ſecurely; which, however, cannot happen till ſome of the great powers of Europe have acknowledged the French government, created by the revolution, without a Capet at its head.

*Secret Negociations, under my Direction, with Sweden.*

BEFORE my time, as I have already ſaid, Sweden intereſted itſelf much in behalf of the priſoners in the temple; but as it was ſuſpected that Neckar (who, with his wife and daughter, was the original cauſe of their ever being priſoners) had ſome hand in that interference, no notice was taken of it.

Since my time, and by the aſſiſtance of freſh mediators, an alliance has been concluded between Sweden and Denmark; two nations which have been for ages more inimical to each other than the Engliſh and French ever were. As yet I cannot diſcover the contents of this treaty; which, however, for the preſent, and until France is able to act, will keep the balance of the north in pretty good order, and prevent the incroaching deſigns of Ruſſia.

Privately on my own account, as an individual in power, I have been more flattered by communications from this country than any other

other. Baron de S——, or rather, as I have reaſon to believe, his wife for him, offered to be the firſt to acknowledge me the Auguſtus of France, as ſoon as I ſhould proclaim myſelf ſuch; but as he expreſſed a wiſh at the ſame time to intermeddle in the affairs of the interior of France, by adviſing me to recal all the conſtitutional emigrants (all of whom were friends to the baroneſs, and greater intriguers than any other deſcription of emigrants, Dumourier only excepted) the baron received no anſwer from me; for I well knew that to be acknowledged by Sweden, without a ſimilar acknowledgement from other powers, would be of no ſervice to me; and if other powers did acknowledge me, I could better do without the concurrence of Sweden, than Sweden could without the alliance and ſubſidy of France.

## DENMARK.

SO long as Ruſſia has ſufficient confidence in the king of Denmark to let him be her jailor, by keeping the unfortunate Ruſſian

emperor, Ivan, a priſoner in Holſtein; and ſo long as the generals and miniſters of Denmark remain penſioners to Ruſſia, France cannot, I think, depend on any engagements with the Daniſh government; particularly as it always has been, and ſtill is, directed by the intereſts of the moment, which, by a ſudden change, may induce as ſudden a breach of them.

Denmark has before its eyes the reward which Poland receives from Ruſſia for the ſhare it had, by aſſiſting her, in the ruin of Sweden and Turkey: and what better fate can this country expect, ſhould Ruſſia once become ſufficiently powerful to overthrow the barrier now between them by the conqueſt and partition of Sweden? It would then only have the honour of being the laſt victim ſacrificed to the ambition of Ruſſia.

Denmark, however, by a firm connection with France and her allies, may not only preſerve its independence, but prevent the increaſe of the Ruſſian power in the north; while with French trade and French ſubſidies it would enrich its people and augment its navy, ſo as to make the Engliſh no longer dare to inſult its flag with impunity, as they have done during the preſent war. As to

France,

France, it can derive no other advantage from an alliance with Denmark than that of preſerving the balance of power: an advantage, in which all Europe muſt participate with her.

## *Secret Negociations, under my Direction, with Denmark.*

I HAVE already mentioned the treaty between this country and Sweden concluded under my auſpicies.

Denmark, or rather the Daniſh government, has ſhewn in its ſecret tranſactions with the French government ſince the war, a degree of avarice which borders upon meanneſs. Not ſatisfied with the immenſe gain derived from its trade with France, it inſiſted on ſharing the money produced by the ſale or valuation of all Engliſh prizes brought into the harbours of Denmark and Norway; and in lieu of this obliged France to pay an immenſe ſubſidy, and fit out a fleet for the ſole purpoſe of protecting the Daniſh merchantmen. The French government was obliged to put up with

with theſe hard conditions, but it will always remember them.

No country has gained more by the war than Denmark, not excepting America itſelf. Dutch and German veſſels from Rybeck, Hamburgh, and Bremen, have paid large ſums of money for the uſe of the Daniſh colours; and in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies the Daniſh poſſeſſions have ſerved as depots for French goods and property, ſaved from the conqueſts made by the Engliſh; and alſo for the French cruiſers to carry their prizes to; by which the Daniſh government has received more money than the real value of theſe poſſeſſions.

But if much French gold has thus been ſent into Denmark, we may hope it has been accompanied by ſome French principles of liberty, which may one day produce extraordinary events in this deſpotic government: and while the gold finds its way back to France, its original ſource, the principles remaining behind may enable France, in her turn, to dictate its own terms; I am certain, however, that ſhe will always be too generous to retaliate.

PRUSSIA.

## PRUSSIA.

THE armies which the king of Pruſſia employs againſt France would do more honour and real ſervice to his country if employed in its favour; for it is the common intereſt of France and Pruſſia to unite as cloſely as poſſible for oppoſing their common enemies, Auſtria, Ruſſia, and England. Of theſe Auſtria will never forgive Pruſſia the loſs of Sileſia; Ruſſia never forget the ſhare of Poland which ſhe has been obliged to allow that power; and both Ruſſia and England will always envy it the poſſeſſion of Dantzic, both on account of its trade, and as it may enable Pruſſia to become a maritime power in the Baltic.

In its preſent political connection Pruſſia can only pretend to the fourth place, as Auſtria, Ruſſia, and England muſt rank before it: with France, its former, and I hope future, ally, Pruſſia will not only hold the ſecond place in the general alliance, but in the

north

north will be the firſt power, and the protector of the allies of France in that quarter.

By the aſſiſtance of France, Pruſſia may ſoon be enabled to build and fit out as numerous fleets from Dantzic, as the kings of Poland did a hundred and ſeventy, and a hundred and eighty years ago, in their wars with Sweden; particularly as he poſſeſſes in Pomerania, and other parts of his dominions, all the principal materials neceſſary for building the moſt numerous navy in Europe; and French, Daniſh, and Swediſh officers and ſhip-builders ſhould ſoon teach the Pruſſians not only to conſtruct, but to manœuvre and fight theſe ſhips; while the king of Pruſſia, in conſequence of his family connections in Holland, might induce the Dutch to join cordially with him.

An alliance with France may, ſooner than Pruſſia expects, put Hanover into his power, for it is undoubtedly true, that the Hanoverians would prefer the Pruſſian to the inſolent Engliſh government.

For all that France can and will do for Pruſſia ſhe only expects, in return, that Pruſſia, which has it in his power, and whoſe intereſt requires the meaſure, ſhall procure a commercial

cial and political alliance between France and Holland, as the only mean of preventing the Engliſh from becoming as deſpotic over the commerce of the world, as ſhe already is over all its ſeas.

Pruſſia has ſhewed by its conduct in more than one inſtance during the war, that it did not like the cauſe in which it had engaged, and fought rather againſt its inclination. I therefore do not doubt but as ſoon as I have a ſettled government, and offer to treat with Pruſſia, it will accept the propoſal; eſpecially if a French ſubſidy fills up the void which the privation of that from England may leave in the Pruſſian treaſury.

*Secret negociations, under my direction, with Pruſſia.*

HOW happy it was that the French treaſury, the French crown-jewels, and the French reſources did not emigrate with the Bourbons. Without theſe the king of Pruſſia would undoubtedly, in 1792, have

have occupied the caſtle of the Thuilleries, which, thanks to them, is ſtill, in 1794, a national palace, occupied by a French convention. But as I had no ſhare in the tranſactions of 1792, and as what paſſed at that time is pretty well known, or at leaſt ſuſpected, I will paſs it over in ſilence.

K——ff, in Flanders, and K——th, in Germany, have both held ſecret negociations with us; and under pretence of treating about exchange of priſoners, communicated the plans of their allied enemies to their declared enemy. But *no money, no Pruſſian*; France did not obtain theſe communications gratis. It cannot, however, be denied, that the advantages derived from them were more than equivalent to the expence by which they were gained.

To theſe ſecret negociations with Pruſſia, France is indebted for more than one of her fortified cities both in Germany, Alſace, and Lorrain; and her gratitude will be due to the ſame ſource, ſhould the ſucceſs of the French arms be ſuch as to make her the dictator of a future peace.

In the preſent ſtate of affairs, I neither can or will ſay more on the ſubject, than that if I triumph

triumph over my enemies at home, I ſhall not long have a foreign enemy in the king of Pruſſia; who may, perhaps, be the firſt to acknowledge, that merit has as much right as birth to a throne which it knows how to aſcend.

## HOLLAND.

HOLLAND is the great commercial rival of England, both in Europe, and the Eaſt and Weſt Indies. But as the reſources of the latter are greater than thoſe of the former, their rivalſhip muſt ſoon be at an end, the Dutch trade entirely deſtroyed, and England alone monopolize the commerce of all countries, and all climates, from one pole to the other.

When one weak ſtate unites with a powerful one to deſtroy another weak ſtate, it never fails to work out its own deſtruction. Holland joined with England to deſtroy the trade of France, of Spain, and of Portugal; and Holland, or rather England, ſucceeded. But what

what has already been the conſequence of this conduct to the Dutch? Has not their commerce been, and is it not ſtill daily declining, in the ſame proportion as that of England increaſes? And is it not probable that it will be wholly deſtroyed, whenever the intereſts of England ſhall ceaſe to require a Dutch alliance, and that ſhe ſhall think proper to take poſſeſſion of the Dutch colonies, which ſhe can do whenever ſhe pleaſes; for it is an undeniable fact, that ſince the laſt war Holland poſſeſſes theſe colonies intirely by the grace and good will of England; becauſe, after their fooliſh connection with England, no other maritime power could or would oppoſe the ſeizing of their colonies.

The remaining Dutch trade is greater in proportion to the trade of France, than the trade of England is in proportion to that of Holland. Holland has therefore no rivalſhip, no uſurpation to apprehend from France; whoſe navy, united with that of the Hollanders, would, perhaps, be ſufficiently powerful to reſtore to Holland the trade which England has uſurped: it is therefore the intereſt of the Dutch (and indeed their exiſtence, as a commercial nation, as a maritime power, depends

upon it) to exchange the chains of England, for the ties of friendſhip and alliance of France.

France only can reſtore to Holland its former flouriſhing commerce: France only can preſerve to Holland its colonies: France only can protect Holland againſt Auſtria in Europe, and againſt England in Aſia. France would gain no advantage by this alliance, but that of drawing an ally from England. Holland would gain not only a ſincere ally but a powerful protector; who might be generous enough to allow her the excluſive enjoyment of the benefits derivable from the ruinous ſtate into which the revolution has plunged the national commerce of France; an object upon which the Engliſh and other nations are ſpeculating extenſively, and preparing to enrich themſelves as ſoon as the return of peace will permit it.

No ſecret negociation has been propoſed to me from the preſent Stadtholderian government; but the Dutch patriots have, ever ſince I was in power, continued to build the ſame caſtles in the air as they have done ſince the year 1787, when they were driven from their country. The only real ſervice they have

rendered my government has been by propagating, not French liberty, for they are too great cowards to be employed on ſuch an occaſion, but hatred againſt England and the Engliſh.

## ENGLAND.

WAR, eternal war with England.—Never any other peace but armiſtices, that my troops may breathe a little and recover their ſtrength, in order to obtain new victories over the abominable Engliſh nation. Between England and France, to combat muſt be the national occupation. England muſt be conquered, muſt be deſtroyed, though the deſtruction of France ſhould be the conſequence; for while England exiſts, the exiſtence of France is precarious and doubtful: and thirty millions of men muſt live in expectation of death or bondage, not from the bravery, but the abominable treachery of ten millions of Engliſhmen, if a peace is concluded before the few of that nation who ſhall ſurvive are obliged to wear French fetters. I ſay "the

few

few who ſhall ſurvive," becauſe, whether I die or live, I am certain that our numerous brave armed country-men will, in a few years, ſuffer few ſurviving Engliſhmen to pollute the earth, and deceive or tyrranize over poſterity.

Engliſh treachery has burnt our fleets, kindled the civil war in France, and vomited forged aſſignats upon the French territories in exchange for French bullion. Engliſh treachery has deſtroyed the trade of France, conquered her colonies, and fed, armed, and protected the raſcally emigrants, only becauſe they were proſcribed in France, and enemies to their countrymen the French. In a word, all the blood ſpilt, either upon the ſcaffold or in the field; all the ſufferings, all the wants, and all the miſeries endured by Frenchmen, either at home or abroad, are to be aſcribed to Engliſh treachery: and unworthy muſt he be of the name of a Frenchman, who can or will ever forget it. No, to hate and to deſtroy the Engliſh ſhall be the firſt maxims a French woman teaches her child; and thence deſcending, ſhall be bequeathed from father to ſon as long as any Engliſhmen exiſt.

France has reaſon to hate Auſtria; but with reſpect to England ſhe is bound in duty to deteſt and abhor it. Auſtria only intrigues; England not only intrigues but betrays; and bribes all other ſtates at war with France to do the ſame.

What we have ſuffered from the other powers at war with us, a few years may repair; but the ſufferings, the loſſes, which Engliſh treachery has cauſed us, none who do not live to ſee the deſtruction of England will ever ſee repaired.

Until we are ready to give the grand blow to England, all our efforts muſt be employed to make Auſtria, and the other Engliſh allies, feel the effects of our ſtrength; and perceive at the ſame time our abhorrence of their principal ſupporter, England.

The alliance between England and the other coaleſced powers cannot long exiſt in its preſent ſtate. Pruſſia, and the German princes in the Pruſſian intereſt will, in all probability, before two more campaigns, grow tired of being the tools of the ambition, treachery, and gold of Auſtria and England: France muſt then form ſuch connections as I have pointed out in different parts of this work;

work; but no connection, however advantageous, muſt be formed which may prevent France from carrying into execution its favourite ſcheme,—the deſtruction of England.

The Engliſh dominions in Europe will ſoon become a conqueſt to the arms of France, if we can firſt conquer her Eaſt and Weſt India poſſeſſions. The conduct of the Engliſh, both in Aſia and the Weſt Indies, has been, as in Europe, treacherous and deſpotic; and ſhe has therefore in both countries more enemies than ſubjects, who wiſh for nothing more than an opportunity of throwing off her yoke. With this opportunity it is the buſineſs of the French government to preſent them, by forming alliances with the Americans, and with Tippoo Sultan, and the Marattas. A plentiful ſhare of the ſpoils of the Engliſh muſt alſo be offered them, and French officers and ſoldiers muſt be ſent to inſtruct and aſſiſt thoſe Engliſh ſubjects who wiſh to riſe againſt their tyrants.

If it were poſſible no Engliſhman ſhould be ſpared, for the ſelf-called Engliſh patriots are no better than the reſt of their countrymen; they were Engliſhmen before they were patriots; and many became patriots for

no other purpoſe but to acquire a leſs dangerous livelihood than that acquired upon the high road; and of all the Engliſh patriots, or rather political fortune-hunters, who have ſwarmed over France ſince the revolution, none, except an Engliſh lord, who was a ſtock-broker, were any better than beggars, ſcheming-adventurers, or ſwindlers, who were ready to ſell their principles to any who would buy them; and for a penſion, or a place, turn obſequiouſly, as they were directed, republicans or royaliſts. For this reaſon I ordered all the Engliſh, without exception, to be arreſted throughout France, well knowing that a man, who offers to ſell England to the French, will ſell France to the Engliſh, if his ambition or intereſt requires it.

With this country I have had no ſecret tranſactions, nor ever will. The decree which orders Frenchmen to give quarter no longer to Engliſh priſoners is ſufficient.

## THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

WITHOUT the power and protection of France all the different ſtates that compoſe the German empire would, long before the preſent war, have been ſubjugated either to Auſtria alone in the laſt century, or to Auſtria and Pruſſia in the preſent. Their independence they owe to France, and muſt, as long as it exiſts, continue indebted to her for it; it is therefore their intereſt not to aſſiſt thoſe powers, from whom they have every thing to apprehend, in order to weaken France, which is, in fact, weakening themſelves. I know that many of theſe ſtates fight againſt their will in the preſent war; and this it is the duty and intereſt of France to prevent in future, by changing ſome of the laws of the empire, whenever peace takes place.

The penſions, or ſubſidies, formerly paid by France to ſome of the petty German princes, may hereafter be better employed in augmenting the ſubſidies formerly given to the Turks and the Swedes.

## THE HANS TOWNS.

THE neutrality of theſe towns has always been, and will be in all future wars, beneficial to France. By means of their veſſels France has often obtained articles indiſpenſibly neceſſary to her, and which were the produce of countries with which ſhe was at war; and as the inhabitants of theſe towns are in general poor, it coſts leſs to get ammunition, and other contraband articles ſmuggled by them, than to purchaſe it from America and other neutral ſtates.

Another advantageous circumſtance attending theſe towns, and which may hereafter contribute to giving liberty to all Germany, is their geographical ſituation. In conſequence of this they may become nurſeries for the propagators of French principles of liberty; which, as they look upon themſelves as republicans, they will moſt cordially labour to ſpread through the different countries their commerce gives them a right to viſit.

## AMERICA.

THE Engliſh party in this country is the moſt wealthy, but the French the moſt numerous. Waſhington alone keeps the latter from deſtroying and plundering the former; but at his death there is no doubt but America will *ſanſculotize* itſelf, and be as it were the ſecond volume of France.

It was fortunate for the French popular government that the preſent Americans ſtill retain part of the character of their Engliſh anceſtors,—their avarice and their ingratitude. The former perſuaded them to furniſh France with what it principally wanted—proviſions and ammunition; and the latter made them forget that they were aſſiſting the actual deſtroyers of HIM (Louis the XVIth) to whom they owe their liberty and independence.

It is for the intereſt of France and the advantage of America to be united. An alliance with France will prevent the Engliſh from attempting again to enſlave the Americans, and

and ſecure to them at all times a market in France for their ſuperfluous productions. And ſhould the French ſucceed in annihilating England and Engliſhmen, no leſs than all the Engliſh poſſeſſions in Canada and the Weſt Indies may fall to the ſhare of America; not to ſpeak of Spaniſh America, ſhould Spain continue its preſent impolitic connections.

France cannot, for a long time to come, expect any aſſiſtance from the military power of America; but America, by withholding its proviſion from the Engliſh Weſt Indies, may ſtarve out theſe colonies, and make them an eaſier conqueſt to the arms of France; which the Americans are called upon to do, both by duty and vengeance, after the piracy and inſolence exerciſed by the Engliſh towards them ſince the breaking out of the war.

The treaties concluded by me with America, ſince I governed France, cannot be called ſecret, at it is univerſally known that the produce of America is ſent to France, and the gold of France to America; that French emiſſaries are buſied among the Americans, and that American emiſſaries in French pay are buſied among the Engliſh and Iriſh.

*Secret*

*Secret Negociations, under my Direction, with Tippoo Sultan and the Marattas.*

WHEN the royalty of the Bourbons was come to its laſt gaſp in December 1791, and January 1792, ſeveral veſſels with French officers of artillery and engineers, and a number of mechanics, were ſent to aſſiſt and inſtruct the troops and ſubjects of this Indian prince; whoſe hatred to the Engliſh is ſo great that he forgot the inability of France to fulfil its treaty with him, when Cornwallis's good luck brought him before the capital of his dominions, and, of his own accord, as ſoon as he had concluded peace with the Engliſh, ſent new emiſſaries to negociate with that very France which had deceived him, in order to obtain its aſſiſtance to humble and deſtroy the Engliſh, who had ſo lately humbled and nearly deſtroyed himſelf.

It is incomprehenſible how twelve millions of Indians can remain ſubjects, or rather ſlaves in their own country, to the Engliſh, of whom there are not above one hundred thouſand

ſand native Engliſhmen able to reſiſt them if they choſe to revolt. But this is a fact, which proves either their terror of Engliſh deſpotiſm, or the enervated weakneſs of mind of theſe Indians.

The French government ſent ſome agents laſt year, by a Daniſh veſſel, to continue the negociations which had been opened by Tippoo Sultan in 1791 : and by another veſſel of the ſame nation, we laſt month received news of their arrival, and the welcome given them by Tippoo : we now, therefore, entertain well-grounded hopes that, before the end of the preſent century, we may ſee the juſt now mentioned enervated Indians, aſſiſted by the forces of Tippoo Sultan and the Marattas, diſplay the ſame ſpirit of independence that the Americans did, and undoubtedly with the ſame ſucceſs.

The Marattas, though a brave and warlike nation, have been in Aſia the ſame tools of Engliſh treachery as the Dutch and other powers have been in Europe. With their aſſiſtance England has nearly ruined Tippoo Sultan; but ſhe has at the ſame time inſtructed them in European tactics: and according to the report of our agents, the Marattas are

now

now ready to join Tippoo whenever he chuſes to attack the Engliſh. The acquiſition of this knowledge, by our friends in the Eaſt, is of the more conſequence becauſe now ſome few French officers may, without much trouble, complete the inſtruction of the Marattas in the European manner of carrying on war; and then no doubt but they and Tippoo Sultan together may, in one campaign, drive the Engliſh from a country where they ſhould never have been permitted to ſet foot.

By the taking of Pondicherry England cauſed little loſs to France, and awakened much jealouſy in the Indian nations: for while the Dutch and the Danes have any ſettlements in that part of India, or in Bengal, France will always have opportunity of ſending agents; and, in caſe of neceſſity, military aſſiſtance to the Indian princes.

It formerly coſt France more to keep Pondicherry than it has done the preſent French government to induce the Danes, by bribery, to make their ſettlements as ſerviceable to France as Pondicherry was before.

Theſe, and many other ſecret reaſons, induce me to believe I ſhall not be accuſed of gaſco-

gaſconading for having ſaid, that France, *with the aſſiſtance of her friends*, may ſoon be able to deſtroy the Engliſh both in the Eaſt and the Weſt; and when that is accompliſhed France *alone* will ſoon ſhew the world, that England in Europe ſhall be a French province.

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I have now finiſhed this my Political Teſtament. Much important buſineſs of the moment has obliged me to make it ſhorter than I intended when it was begun. Daily occurrences have often leſſened my energy while I was employed in this work:—an audacious faction has dared to ſhew its head; but it ſhall only be to haſten the loſs of that head by the guillotine.

If Frenchmen poſſeſſed but common ſenſe, three years of democracy and two years of republican government, in all five years of miſery, murder, plunder, and anarchy, would be able to convince them that not a democratical, but a monarchical government, can alone make them happy:—yes, a monarch only can make them happy; and an emperor Robert-ſpierre ſhall make them more happy than they ever

ever have been under their kings of the Capet race.

It is not the number, but the happineſs of his ſubjects, that conſtitutes the greatneſs of a monarch.

Amputation is often neceſſary to ſave the life of an individual; it is ſometimes equally ſo to ſave that of a ſtate. I have therefore been obliged to uſe it, frequently againſt my will: but I know that as long as France is full of cankers, that is, of her infamous nobles, of her hypocritical prieſts, and of all thoſe other individuals whoſe fortunes or talents make them vain or weak enough to oppoſe my deſigns for the grandeur and happineſs of France, amputations and inciſions muſt take place; — and they ſhall take place.

When my labours ſhall have received their reward; when I ſhall reign both in ſafety and in glory; and when Frenchmen are perfectly quiet and ſubmiſſive; then, and not till then, the ſcaffolds of the guillotine ſhall give place to the altars of Ceres.

*Dixi et ſalvavi animam meam.*

Paris, the 3d of Thermidor, the laſt year of the ſelf-called French republic, or of the life of

Max. Robertſpierre.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

## ERRATA.

Page 1, line 10, *for* amateurs, *read* lovers.
1, last line, *for* arbitor, *read* arbiter.
6, line 22, *for* indiviſable, *read* indiviſible.
8, line 5, *for* Pichegreu, *read* Pichegru.
8, line 8, *for* Demourier, *read* Dumourier.
10, line 1, *for* conqeuring, *read* conquering.
14, line 8, *for* manufacturies, *read* manufactories.
17, line 19, *for* part to be ſent, *read* part being ſent.
29, line 26, *for* place to which, *read* place which.
50, line 14, *for* Ottoman port, *read* Ottoman porte.
70, line 8, *for* freſh, *read* French.